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Abstract
In this paper, we prove that both problems for calculating the Banzhaf power index and the
Shapley–Shubik power index for weighted majority games are NP-complete. c© 2001 Elsevier
Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Weighted voting is frequently used when there is su6cient reason to create or main-
tain districts which have nontrivial variations in populations. To analyze weighted vot-
ing, there is a weighted majority game in the game theory [3,6]. Banzhaf [2] introduced
an index, which is called the Banzhaf power index, for measuring an individual’s voting
power. Another value concept for measuring voting power was introduced by Shapley
and Shubik [9], which is called the Shapley–Shubik power index. The Shapley–Shubik
power index is a special application of a more general value concept introduced by
Shapley in [8].
In this paper, we prove that both problems for calculating the Banzhaf power index
and the Shapley–Shubik power index for weighted majority games are NP-complete.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we give some de<nitions and notations. There are n players de-
noted by {1; : : : ; n}. The weighted majority game is a sequence of nonnegative integers
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G=(q;w1; w2; : : : ; wn) satisfying the condition that wi¿0 and 12
∑n
i=1 wi¡q6
∑n
i=1 wi,
where each wi denotes the voting weight of player i and the integer q denotes the
quota for the game. A coalition is a subset of players. A coalition S is called a winning
coalition (respectively a losing coalition) when
∑
i∈S wi¿q (respectively
∑
i∈S wi¡q).
In this paper, we consider a popular weighted majority games such that the quota
q satis<es that q=  12
∑n
i=1 wi + 1. It means that a coalition is winning if and only
if the sum of corresponding voting weights is strictly greater that the half of the sum
total of all the voting weights. For any coalition S of players, we say that player i is
a swing with respect to S if and only if (S; S{i}) is a pair of a losing coalition and
a winning coalition (S1S2 denotes the symmetric diEerence of S1 and S2). The raw
Banzhaf power index denotes the vector 
=(
1; 
2; : : : ; 
n) such that 
i is equal to the
number of coalitions for which player i is a swing. The Banzhaf power index is the
vector 
∗=(
∗1 ; 
∗2 ; : : : ; 
∗n ) de<ned by 
∗i = 
i=
∑n
i=1 
i.
Given a permutation  de<ned on {1; 2; : : : ; n}, we denote (i) by i for each
i∈{1; 2; : : : ; n}. For any permutation  on {1; 2; : : : ; n}, we say that player j is the
pivot player with respect to  if and only if the coalition S = {1; 2; : : : ; j−1} sat-
is<es that S is losing and S ∪{j} is winning. The raw Shapley–Shubik power in-
dex denotes the vector ’=(’1; ’2; : : : ; ’n) such that ’i is equal to the number of
permutations de<ned on the set of players for which player i is the pivot player.
The Shapley–Shubik power index is the vector ’∗=(’∗1 ; ’∗2 ; : : : ; ’∗n ) de<ned by
’∗i =’i=n!
If we calculate the Banzhaf power index conforming to an algorithm by the de<nition,
then the algorithm requires O(2nn) time. Similarly, a naive algorithm for calculating the
Shapley–Shubik power index requires O(n!n) time. In 1982, Lucas et al. [7] proposed
a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm which calculates both the Banzhaf power index
and the Shapley–Shubik power index simultaneously. Their algorithm is based on the
ordinary dynamic programming technique.
3. Banzhaf index
We discuss the problem for calculating the Banzhaf power index.
BZ1
Instance: A positive integer n and a sequence of nonnegative integers (q;w1; : : : ; wn)
satisfying q=  12
∑n
i=1 wi + 1 and w1¿w2¿ · · ·¿wn.
Question: Does the raw Banzhaf power index (
1; : : : ; 
n) of the weighted majority
game G=(q;w1; : : : ; wn) satisfy 
n¿0?
The problem BZ1 is similar to the subset sum problem [4, 5]. Recently, Alfonsin
showed the NP-completness of some variations of subset sum problems [1].
We prove NP-completeness of BZ1 by presenting a polynomial-time reduction from
the partition problem (PR), which is a well-known NP-complete problem [4, 5].
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PR
Instance: A positive integer k and a sequence of positive integers (a1; : : : ; ak) satis-
fying that 12
∑k
i=1 ai is an integer.
Question: Is there a subset S ⊆{1; : : : ; k} such that ∑i∈S ai = 12∑ki=1 ai?
Theorem 1. BZ1 is NP-complete.
Proof. If problem BZ1 has YES answer, then there exists a coalition for which player
n is a swing. The coalition becomes a polynomial size certi<cate and so problem BZ1
is in the class NP.
Given a problem instance of PR, we construct a problem instance of BZ1 as follows.
We put n= k + 1, q= 12(
∑k
i=1 ai + 2) and
wi =
{
ai (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n− 1);
1 (i = n):
The above de<nitions imply that the quota q is an integer satisfying
q = (1=2)
(
k∑
i=1
ai + 2
)
=
⌈
(1=2)
(
n∑
i=1
wi + 1
)⌉
:
Assume that 
n¿0. Then there exists a coalition S∗ such that player n is a swing with
respect to S∗. Without loss of generality, we can assume that S∗ does not contain
player n. Since n is a swing with respect to S∗,
∑
i∈S∗
ai ¡ q6
∑
i∈S∗
ai + an =
∑
i∈S∗
ai + 1:
The above inequalities and the integrality of weights imply that
∑
i∈S∗ ai = q − 1=
1
2
∑k
i=1 ai, and so PR has YES answer.
Next, we consider the inverse implication. Assume that PR has YES answer; i.e.,
there exists a subset S∗ ⊆{1; 2; : : : ; n− 1} satisfying that ∑i∈S∗ ai = 12∑ki=1 ai = q− 1.
Then, it is clear that player n is a swing with respect to S∗ and so 
n¿0.
The above theorem directly implies the following.
Corollary 1. Calculating the Banzhaf power index is NP-hard.
In many application settings, there exist a few major parties and many minor parties.
When we are interested in major parties (the players with large voting weights), we
need to consider the following problem.
BZ2
Instance: A positive integer n and a sequence of nonnegative integers (q;w1; : : : ; wn)
satisfying q=  12
∑n
i=1 wi + 1 and w1¿w2¿ · · ·¿wn.
Question: Does the raw Banzhaf power index (
1; : : : ; 
n) of the weighted majority
game G=(q;w1; : : : ; wn) satisfy 
1¿
2?
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Theorem 2. BZ2 is NP-complete.
Proof. For any coalition S, we de<ne the coalition NS as follows:
NS =


S (|{1; 2} ∩ S| = 0);
S{1; 2} (|{1; 2} ∩ S| = 1);
S (|{1; 2} ∩ S| = 2):
Clearly from the de<nition, ( NS)= S. We can show easily that if player 2 is a swing
with respect to S, then player 1 is a swing with respect to NS. It implies that when

1¿
2, there exists a coalition S∗ such that player 2 is not a swing with respect to
S∗ and player 1 is a swing with respect to S∗. Then the coalition S∗ becomes a
polynomial size certi<cate and so BZ2 is in the class NP.
To show the NP-completeness, we construct the following weighted majority game
G′ from a problem instance of PR. We assume that a1¿a2¿ · · ·¿ak . Then we put
n= k + 2,
wi =


∑k
i=1 ai + 1 (i = 1);∑k
i=1 ai (i = 2);
ai−2 (i = 3; 4; : : : ; n);
and q= 32
∑k
i=1 ai + 1. Clearly from the de<nition, G
′=(q;w1; : : : ; wn) becomes a
weighted majority game with q=  12
∑n
i=1 wi+1. Then it is easy to show that 
1¿
2
if and only if PR has YES answer.
The above theorem implies that it is hard to calculate the Banzhaf power index even
if we restrict to the players with large index values. Since 
1¿1=n, we can decide
whether 
1¿
2 by calculating all the elements of the Banzhaf power index satisfying
that corresponding values are greater than or equal to 1=n. Thus, the problem for
calculating all the elements of the Banzhaf power index satisfying that corresponding
values are greater than or equal to 1=n is NP-hard.
4. Shapley–Shubik index
We consider the following problem.
SS1
Instance: A positive integer n and a sequence of nonnegative integers (q;w1; : : : ; wn)
satisfying q=  12
∑n
i=1 wi + 1 and w1¿w2¿ · · ·¿wn.
Question: Does the raw Shapley–Shubik power index (’1; : : : ; ’n) of the weighted
majority game G=(q;w1; : : : ; wn) satisfy ’n¿0?
We prove NP-hardness of SS by presenting a polynomial time reduction from prob-
lem PR described in the previous section.
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Theorem 3. SS1 is NP-complete.
Proof. Assume that problem SS1 has YES answer. Then there exists a permutation
for which player n is the pivot player. The permutation becomes a polynomial size
certi<cate and so problem SS1 is in the class NP.
For any problem instance of PR, we construct the weighted majority game G with
n= k + 1 players de<ned in the proof of Theorem 1.
Assume that ’n¿0. Then there exists a permutation ∗ such that player n is the pivot
player with respect to ∗. Let S = {∗1 ; ∗2 ; : : : ; ∗i−1} where i is the integer satisfying
∗i = n. Then the equality
∑
i∈S ai = a∗1 + a∗2 + · · ·+ a∗i−1 holds. Since n is the pivot
player with respect to ∗,
∑
i∈S
ai ¡ q6
∑
i∈S
ai + an =
∑
i∈S
ai + 1:
The above inequalities and the integrality of weights imply that
∑
i∈S ai = q − 1=
1
2
∑k
i=1 ai, and so PR has YES answer.
Next, we consider the inverse implication. Assume that there exists a subset S ⊆
{1; 2; : : : ; k} satisfying ∑i∈S ai = 12∑ki=1 ai. Let  be a permutation satisfying the con-
dition that there exists an integer i such that i = n and S = {1; 2; : : : ; i−1}. Then, it
is clear that player n= i is the pivot player with respect to  and so ’n¿0.
The above theorem directly implies the following.
Corollary 2. Calculating the Shapley–Shubik power index is NP-hard.
When we are interested in the players with large voting weights, we need to consider
the following problem.
SS2
Instance: A positive integer n and a sequence of nonnegative integers (q;w1; : : : ; wn)
satisfying q= 12
∑n
i=1 wi + 1 and w1¿w2¿ · · ·¿wn.
Question: Does the raw Shapley–Shubik power index (’1; : : : ; ’n) of the weighted
majority game G=(q;w1; : : : ; wn) satisfy ’1¿’2?
Theorem 4. SS2 is NP-complete.
Proof. For any permutation , N denotes the permutation obtained from  by ex-
changing the positions of players 1 and 2. Clearly from the de<nition, ( N)= . We can
show easily that if player 2 is the pivot player with respect to , then player 1 is the
pivot player with respect to N. It implies that when ’1¿’2, there exists a permutation
∗ such that player 2 is not the pivot player with respect to ∗ and player 1 is the
pivot player with respect to ∗. Then the permutation ∗ becomes a polynomial size
certi<cate and so SS2 is in the class NP.
310 Y. Matsui, T. Matsui / Theoretical Computer Science 263 (2001) 305–310
To show the NP-completeness, we construct the weighted majority game G′ de<ned
in Theorem 2. Then it is easy to show that ’1¿’2 if and only if PR has YES answer.
The above corollary implies that it is hard to calculate the Shapley–Shubik power
index even if we restrict to the players with large index values. The problem for calcu-
lating all the elements of the Shapley–Shubik power index satisfying that corresponding
values are greater than or equal to 1=n is also NP-hard.
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